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1INTRODUCTION
For a long time technological developments in telecommunications and computers have
followed very distinct trajectories. Today, the basic design parameters which form the
core of technological regimes (Georghiou, et al. 1986) are increasingly becoming more
similar, not only in terms of the material properties but also with respect to the
manufacturing process involved. Although the first signs of the convergence process
became apparent in the late 1950s it was not until the early 1970s that it really took off.
At that time large numbers of powerful digital components were brought onto the market
at relatively low costs. In the following years subsequent improvements accelerated the
rate of adoption of these components in all kinds of electronic equipment. Today almost
every single electronic device is based on the same digital technology. Digitalization of
telecommunications and computer equipment has broadened the existing technology base
and facilitated the emergence of large-scale communication networks that carry voice,
data and images. As computers were increasingly accommodated within those
telecommunications networks, previously existing technological and market boundaries
became vague. The blurring boundaries between the computer and telecommunications
markets soon challenged the core competencies of the traditional suppliers and induced
some lateral entry’: i.e. entrance of firms from adjacent markets. In the
telecommunications industry the first signs of convergence appeared through the
introduction of stored program control (SPC) in the field of digital switching.  1
The second wave of convergence took place during the mid-1980s when analogue
telephone systems were gradually transformed into fully digital networks (Davies, 1991).
2The rise in distributed computing and the digitalization of the telecommunications
network induced a number of telecommunication firms to accumulate skills in software
and micro-electronics and raised the interests of computer manufacturers in
telecommunication technology. At that time a number of authors and industry
practitioners argued that the information technology (IT) industry would eventually offer
a continuum of products, which could not be referred to as either telecommunication or
computer products. They envisioned that all the different IT markets would melt into one
giant information and entertainment industry’ and that firms would react to the new
opportunities by lateral entry into each other’s markets (de Jonquieres, 1989; Business
Week, 25 May 1992, pp. 69671).
The relatively stable environment that characterized the computer industry and
more in particular the telecommunications industry for such a long period, before the
changes mentioned above occurred, induced firms to develop a stable set of routines to
deal with their environment. Today such routinized behaviour does not seem sufficient
to deal with the technological convergence process in information technologies. The
required technological competencies in adjacent technologies is often not present within
the existing technology base. For companies lacking such competencies, several options
are open to acquire the essential technological knowledge. Technology can be developed
in-house or it can be acquired on the market by arms'-length transactions (e.g. using R&D
contracts) or through the acquisition of technologically sophisticated companies.
Between these two extremes, acquisition or internal development, several options are
open to a company. Companies may perform R&D together with a partner, license-in
3technology or use other forms of cooperation. Internal development is costly but often
necessary to achieve the required technological base. Cooperative strategies, on the other
hand, involve less capital and are particularly suited to monitor new technological
developments. In the past decade the number of strategic alliances made by firms has
increased substantially, in particular in high-tech industries (see Hagedoorn, 1996). The
use of alliances, however, often appears only effective in combination with internal
development. Haklisch (1989) has argued convincingly that interdependence is often
used as a viable strategy to strengthen independence. 
The instabilities hat are part of the changes mentioned in the above made many
industry observers in the early 1980's expect  that the convergence process would
provoke a battle between the industry giants IBM and AT&T (Tunstall, 1986). After its
break-up in 1984, AT&T was allowed to enter other (unregulated) markets and it
acquired companies such as MOS Technology and NCR. IBM on the other hand grasped
the opportunity to strengthen its presence in the telecommunications market and bought
telecom equipment makers Rolm Corporation and SBS Satellite. AT&T turned its focus
on the computer industry by acquiring a stake in Olivetti. Although acquisition of
knowledgeable companies seems to be an attractive option for companies that have to
deal with convergent technologies, acquisition strategies are hampered by at least three
main problems (Aldrich and Auster, 1986). The first problem is associated with
information distortion and opportunism, which may mislead the acquiring company. A
second problem is that creative and innovative companies which are incorporated in a
large and bureaucratic structure often lose their flexibility and therefore lose much of
4their original creativity and innovativeness. The third problem is related to the
externalities which are connected to the acquisition of a company. It is often difficult to
divest those assets which were not sought for in the first place. An additional problem
that is associated with acquisitions occurs if a company does not have an already
sufficiently developed level of technological knowledge in a specific field. Then it turns
out to be extremely difficult to absorb the acquired knowledge into its own technological
core. It is often noted that a firm's absorptive capability is to a large degree dependent on
the degree of knowledge in a specific field (Dodgson, 1989; Cohen and Levinthal, 1990;
Levinthal, 1994). Therefore we might argue that if the core of a company’s technology
base is not sufficiently adapted to the new technology, then the absorption of acquired
technological knowledge within the technological core of a company is very difficult.
These factors may explain why most of the acquisitions were (until today) not very
successful. In the late 1980's IBM moved out of telecommunications by selling its share
in Rolm, whereas a large number of telecommunications companies sold their interests
in computer equipment (Malerba et al, 1991). In the early 1990's, it gradually became
clear that the expected 'lateral entry' between the telecommunications and computer
markets had not taken place (Mansell, 1993). Two factors seemed to be responsible for
the low degree of lateral entry that was found in the telecommunications and computer
markets, i.e. economies of scope that turned out to be lower than expected and the
continuing importance of scale economies (Malerba et al, 1991). Economies of scope
which were gained by the joint production of telecommunication and computer
equipment were simply not able to offset the loss of economies of scale. In this paper we
5argue that there is a third, maybe even more important, factor that influenced the low
degree of convergence within firms, namely inertia. Following evolutionary and
ecological theory we will argue that both external and internal inertial forces significantly
reduce the ability of firms to deal with changes in their technological cores. Firms are
often simply not able to adapt swiftly to their changing technological environments.
Against this general background of the process of technological convergence, our
current contribution will pay attention to two topics. One topic deals with the question
to what extent the convergence of telecommunications and computer technologies has
affected a similar degree of convergence in the technological capabilities of individual
companies operating in different fields. Or to put it differently, one of the aims of this
paper is to examine whether the convergence of information and communication
technologies has led to a growing sectoral similarity of firms that were originally active
in different IT markets.  The second topic concerns the relevance of strategic alliances
as companies from different industries and technological fields combine their efforts as
part of a concrete process of technological convergence.
RESEARCH TOPICS AND HYPOTHESES
Patterns of convergence are generally thought to occur at a number of different levels:
the product-market level, the technology level and the firm level (von Tunzelmann,
1988). At the product-market level we find well-known examples of the convergence in
IT such as tele-matics’ products, which embody the convergence between computer and
telecommunications technology. At the technology level we find a change away from
6analogue devices towards completely digital devices as virtually all segments of the IT
industry are affected by the pervasive effect of micro-electronics technology and
software. In this paper the emphasis shifts towards the level of the firms. In that context
we examine whether and to what degree firms from different markets are affected by the
process of technological convergence.
Although telecommunications and computer equipment are based on the same
enabling technologies, it can be argued that the convergence process has taken place
much more slowly than was expected in the early 1980s (Malerba et al., 1991; von
Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987; von Tunzelmann, 1988). The few empirical studies on the
convergence process within firms (von Tunzelmann and Soete, 1987, von Tunzelmann,
1988) showed that patterns of convergence had not significantly affected the core
competencies of the major IT firms.  These analyses were based on US patent data which2
covered the periods 196961984 and 196961986. Most industry observers and
practitioners agree, however, that the convergence process accelerated in the late 1980s
and early 1990s.  Therefore an analysis that is based on data until 1986 is likely to3
underestimate the current magnitude and importance of the convergence process.
Extending the time-frame might therefore be an important step forwards in understanding
the broader implications of these patterns of convergence in IT markets.
In the following analysis of this process of convergence, we not necessarily
witness companies as being rapid, flexible adapters. We much more stress the importance
of inertial forces that prevent organizations from quickly transforming their strategies and
structures according to new demands of the environment. Following evolutionary
7theorists, we argue that apart from a stochastic element in the choice of decisions and
their outcomes, most of the behaviour of firms is relatively predictable and repetitive.
Such standard patterns of behaviour are often labelled routines’ (Nelson and Winter,
1982) or comps’ (McKelvey, 1982). These routines can be compared to biological genes
because they govern a firm’s behaviour and are heritable in the sense that future
behaviour is largely based on today's characteristics (Nelson and Winter, 1982). A firm’s
reliance on basic routines severely reduces its speed of adaptation. However, it would
also be a caricature to perceive firms only as static organizations that are unable to
change. Firms can be engaged in a search’ process in an attempt to increase their fit’
with the environment. Yet, change mechanisms are mainly triggered if the performance
of an organization is well below its aspiration level (Cyert and March, 1963; Lant and
Mezias, 1992). Firms with a relatively successful past are therefore often even more
resistant to change than other firms. This so-called success breeds failure syndrome’
(Starbuck, et al., 1978) is frequently observed with established industry leaders.
Evolutionary theorists argue that firms which are engaged in a search process do not
explore all possible directions but confine their search to the most promising directions.
Firms are often engaged in local search’ only, which means that search is limited to
related areas. Local search and a continued reliance on their basic routines implies that
firms are much better in doing more of the same than they are in adapting to change. We
therefore expect that companies mainly stick to their core businesses and therefore
patterns of convergence are not likely to be found as the most dominant features of
changes within companies. Thus:
8Hypothesis 1: Patterns of technological and product-market convergence have
not significantly affected the technological cores of the
participating companies.
Existing empirical studies on the convergence process do not seem to study strategic
alliance as such, but von Tunzelmann (1988) suggests that “... various ‘stopgap’
arrangements like strategic alliances were being sought to grapple with circumstances
where this was proving a major competitive liability...” (von Tunzelmann, 1988, p.3).
Because of surging R&D costs in combination with shrinking life cycles in all IT
segments, firms are no longer able to monitor all the technological developments in the
IT industry. Therefore, access to knowledge from other players in adjacent markets is
becoming increasingly important (Economic Commission for Europe, 1987;
Korzeniowski, 1988). The convergence process causes the blurring of traditional
technological and sectoral boundaries and therefore increases the need for companies to
keep up with many different technologies (van Tulder and Junne, 1988). Broadening the
existing technology base through internal development would call for a considerable
increase of the already heavy R&D cost burden. The combination of rising R&D costs
and shorter life cycles induces firms to search for alternatives to internal development as
the sole means of developing new capabilities. Cooperation is often considered as a
viable means to monitor several technological developments at relatively low cost. Given
the problems with acquisitions as noted above, it therefore seems interesting to consider
whether strategic technology alliances are increasingly used to deal with patterns of
9technological convergence (see van Tulder and Junne, 1988; Leban et al., 1989; Raphael,
1989; Charles et al., 1989). Therefore: 
Hypothesis 2: Firms tend to converge by means of strategic technology alliances,
in the sense that the number of strategic technology alliances in
neighbouring sectors have increased significantly over time as
compared to the alliances in 'core' sectors.
DATA
For our analysis we use two types of data: patent data and data on strategic technology
alliances. The patent data is based on a database that is compiled by the European Patent
Office (EPO), which was established in 1978 on behalf of 13 European countries.
Inventors which desire the protection of their invention can apply to the EPO for a patent
in one or more of the 13 associated countries. The use of patent statistics has been
criticized on many different grounds (Cohen and Levin, 1989; Griliches, 1990;
Archibugi, 1992). The first and probably most important criticism is related to the use of
patents as a measure of innovative output. It is argued that firms differ considerably in
their propensity to patent. Some firms consider patenting as a viable means of protecting
their innovations whereas others make use of other methods to safeguard their
technological improvements. There are also wide country-specific differences in the
approach towards patenting. Japanese firms, for example, tend to patent every claim,
whereas US companies are more likely to bundle several claims into one patent (see
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Cohen and Levin, 1989). The propensity to patent not only differs across firms but also
across industry sectors.
Another problem of patent statistics is related to the large differences that exist in
the economic and technological importance of individual patents. Although some patents
can be associated with major technological breakthroughs, a far larger number of patents
are of considerably less importance and many patents are not even commercially
exploited (Dorfman, 1987; Graoutzi et al., 1988; Cohen and Levin, 1989). A related
problem is that the majority of patents applied are for product improvements. Although
process innovations are usually not less significant in both economic and technological
terms they are often not patented. In the case of process innovations, secrecy often turns
out to be a viable alternative to patenting. For process innovations lead time and learning
curve advantages also seem to be sufficient to protect the innovation (Nelson, 1987;
Dosi, 1988).
However, there are also a number of advantages of using patent statistics. One
important advantage of patent data over innovation input data is that patents are assigned
to different technology classes which in turn can be (partly) translated into different
economic sectors (Pavitt, 1988; Acs and Audretsch, 1989). Another important factor is
that the chances of a patent being granted are closely related to the technological
sophistication of a product and its innovative features. We might therefore argue that
patents are a relatively good indicator of the level of technological sophistication of a
company (Nystrom and Edvardsson, 1980). We must, however, keep in mind that patent
statistics can not be applied to measure the complete set of technological variables. Patent
11
statistics can only measure the codifiable part of technology, they cannot be used to
measure tacit elements of technology.
In the present analysis patent statistics will be used to measure changes in the
technological cores of major IT companies. In order to guarantee the global’ character
of our sample we incorporated all the leading companies in each sector: i.e. computers,
telecommunications and semiconductors.  We deliberately did not assign companies to4
a certain sectoral category on the basis of their profile but on the basis of their sales level
in a specific sector. That means that we did not a priori label companies as being either
computer firms, telecommunications firms or semiconductor firms according to their past
or present profile. If we had only included firms that fit a certain profile we would not
have accounted for the convergence that existed at the beginning of the time period.
Company-level aggregation of subsidiaries was performed for every year of the analysis.5
Information on company subsidiaries was taken from annual reports and from multiple
volumes of ‘Who Owns Whom’ (Dun and Bradstreet, 197061994). Company structures
therefore differ with respect to the year in which they are analysed. Such an approach
enables us to include also that part of the convergence which can be attributed to take-
overs in adjacent markets. Changes in the technological cores of major IT-producing
companies were measured by analysing the distribution of patents among three major IT
sectors: computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. We assume that shifts in
the core (technological) competencies of firms are reflected in changes in the relative
number of patents that are applied for in a specific sector. 
The data on strategic technology alliances were taken from MERIT's CATI-
12
database (see Appendix II). The CATI-database contains information on over 10,000
agreements (of which some 5,000 agreements are related to the information technology
sector). All the alliances in the database are either related to technology transfer or to
some sort of joint innovative effort. We will use the term alliance to refer to those
cooperative agreements that are not connected through majority ownership. An alliance
can normally be seen as an agreement which is positioned between two extremes: arm’s-
length transactions on the market on the one hand and the complete merger of the two
firms on the other. Our present study focuses on those alliances that were established in
the period 198061993.
The CATI-database is somewhat biased in terms of: 
& a skewness in the distribution of modes of organizations towards those that are
more often reported in the literature
& a possible over-representation of large firms
& the underestimation of certain technology fields which do not belong to the core
technologies
& a possible bias towards Anglo-Saxon organizations. 
Our preoccupation with rather large companies and IT markets, however, implies that our
analysis is unlikely to be seriously biased by these drawbacks.
Data on strategic technology alliances was used to measure the degree to which
alliances are used to cope with the convergence process. As in the case of patents, we
measured for each company the distribution of alliances among three major IT sectors:
computers, telecommunications and semiconductors. In order to safeguard the strategic
13
element in our sample we will study only those alliances which are undertaken for
strategic reasons. Following Hagedoorn (1992) we will refer to alliances as being
strategic if they can reasonably be assumed to affect the long-term product market
positioning of at least one partner. Because alliances between government or academic
institutions and private companies are frequently undertaken for different economic
reasons than the alliances between two or more private companies  (see e.g. Haklisch,6
1986), we will restrict our attention to those alliances which are established between
private companies. For the same reason we do not pay attention to government-initiated
or EU-wide R&D cost-sharing programmes such as ESPRIT, EUREKA or JESSI.
ANALYSIS
A first indicator of the degree of convergence within leading IT companies is the
presence of companies in more than one table of leading companies (see appendix I). In
our sample of leading IT manufacturers eight companies are among the leading
producers of all three types of equipment: i.e. computers, telecommunications and
semiconductors. With the exception of AT&T (and IBM if one includes captive
production) all those players have a European (Philips, Siemens) or Japanese background
(Fujitsu, Hitachi, Matsushita, NEC, Toshiba). This is not remarkable because it is well
known that Japanese and European multinationals have a more diversified character than
their US counterparts.7
Figure 1 shows the distribution of patents of leading computer producing
companies as a percentage of their combined number of patents in all three sectors.
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Convergence seems to be an essential feature of these firms ever since the early 1980s.
Involvement in telecommunications has always been very high and this high level of
telecommunications patents turns out to be relatively stable over time. The data, however,
indicate a decreasing trend of semiconductor patents in favour of computer patents.  
------- insert Figure 1 about here ------
Figure 2 displays a more diffuse pattern. It shows the distribution of strategic
technology alliances of leading computer companies. In general the percentages of
alliances in the different sectors seem to be somewhat inversely related to the percentages
of patents. Alliances related to computers seem to take an intermediate position, whereas
semiconductor alliances account for a relatively large share of all alliances.
Telecommunication alliances, on the other hand, seem to play a relatively modest role.
The data does not indicate any significant trends except for a rise in semiconductor
alliances during the period 198861990 and a corresponding decrease of computer and
telecommunication alliances during the same period. 
------- insert Figure 2 about here --------
In order to test our hypotheses we will now turn to a more quantitative approach.
The first step in our analysis is to test hypothesis 1, which states that ongoing patterns of
technological and product-market convergence have not significantly affected the
15
technological cores of the participating companies. We therefore assume that there is no
positive relationship between time and relative sectoral patenting.
A simple linear regression is used to measure the correlation between time and the
relative importance of patents and alliances in a particular sector (Table 1). We apply
linear regression technique because we expect a linear relationship between patenting
behaviour and time and also because the graphs that are presented above do not indicate
a non-linear pattern. Because we assume that the number of patents or alliances in one
period could be related to the number of patents in the immediate preceding periods we
tested the results for autocorrelation. In only one case (telecommunication patents for
semiconductor firms) we did find autocorrelation to exist (Durbin Watson: 0.93880). We
therefore decided to use an autoregression analysis for that particular case in order to
correct the results for autocorrelation. 
-------- insert Table 1 about here ------
The overall measure of goodness of fit for the linear model is represented by the
coefficient of determination (R ). High R squares are found for computer patents and2
semiconductor patents. R squares for all the other variables are very low. In the case of
computer patents almost 60 per cent of the variance is accounted for by the regression,
whereas in the case of semiconductor patents this figure is about 62 per cent. The F
values that are used to test the significance of the R s and for the significance of the2
dependent variable in the equation show that both computer patents and semiconductor
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patents are significantly dependent on the independent variable (time). The Beta for
computer patents shows a positive sign whereas the Beta for semiconductor patents is
represented by a negative sign. This implies that computer producing companies have
significantly decreased their relative interest in semiconductors in favour of a growing
number of patents in their 'core business'. These results indicate that hypothesis 1, which
asserted that patterns of technological and product-market convergence have not
significantly affected the technological cores of companies, can be confirmed for
computer companies. For the relative distribution of strategic technology alliances we did
not find any significant trends except for the constant in the equation which is significant
for all cases. This indicates a strong stability in the relative distribution of alliances over
time. It is therefore very unlikely that firms converge through means of strategic alliances
as put forward by hypothesis 2, at least in the analysis of leading computer companies.
This means that hypothesis 2 cannot be confirmed on the basis of our analysis.
For leading telecommunication equipment companies we found quite a different
pattern (see Figure 3). Convergence processes seem to have had only a modest impact
on these companies. By far the largest number of technological activities measured by
patents take place in the telecommunications field itself. Overall there seems to be only
a slight interest in computer technology and a decline in the number of semiconductor
patents.
------- insert Figure 3 about here --------
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The distribution of strategic alliances as shown in Figure 4 shows a similar low
degree of involvement in computer technology. Alliances in the field of semiconductors
now account for a significantly larger share. The share of semiconductor alliances as a
percentage of the total number of alliances, however, does not seem to be rising over
time. Since the mid 1980's telecommunication alliances account for most of the IT
alliances of telecommunications equipment producing companies.
--------- insert Figure 4 about here ---------
The results of the linear regression (Table 2) show relatively high R s for patents2
in telecommunications and semiconductors. Corresponding significance levels are 0.05
in the case of telecommunications patents and 0.01 in the case of semiconductor patents
indicate major shifts in the distribution of patents among different technological sectors.
The results of the analysis for computers, however, do not indicate a significant trend in
the relative importance of computer patents for telecommunication equipment producing
companies. Again we find a growth in the relative importance of 'core'
telecommunications patents (p<0.05) and a significant decrease in the relative importance
of semiconductor patents (p<0.001). This, again, confirms hypothesis 1 that convergence
has not been able to change the relative importance of the core technological
competencies.
------- insert Table 2 about here -------
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The results for strategic alliances resemble the previous findings for alliances in
the sense that they do not indicate a growing degree of convergence through strategic
technology alliances. This indicates that hypothesis 2 can also not be confirmed by our
analysis for telecommunications companies.
CONCLUSIONS
In the above we analysed how major computer and telecommunications equipment
companies are affected by the technological convergence process. The results of the
regression analyses have shown that firms are basically unaffected by technological
convergence during the period 1980693. The results indicate a confirmation of
hypothesis 1 which argued that firms are still doing more of the same instead of being
involved in a process of redefining their core’ business. Hypothesis 2, which argued that
firms tend to converge through means of strategic technology alliances, could not be
confirmed on the basis of our analysis. In spite of a significant growth in the absolute
number of alliances in all sectors, cooperative agreements do not seem to be used
extensively for dealing with technological convergence. We may therefore conclude that
technological convergence, although apparent on the technological and product/market
level, does not seem to have affected the core’ competencies of major IT companies.
Firms seemed to have maintained their original technological base. According to
Stinchcombe (1965), there are three reasons which can be responsible for the persistence
of traditional forms. The first reason is that the original form is still the most efficient
form. The second reason is that the original form may be pertained by institutional forces,
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vested interests or a strong ideological position. The third reason is based on the
existence of a natural monopoly or an assured funding base. We believe that in today’s
deregulated and liberalized market structures, institutional forces are not strong enough
to induce firms to take on a particular form. For manufacturing companies, the argument
of a natural monopoly or assured funding base does not seem to be relevant any more.
That means that it is very likely that for many organizations the original technological
base is still seen as the most efficient. Despite the observed technological convergence
we are therefore still able to discern different organizations that are recognizable as to
their traditional base instead of one converged form where the difference between e.g.
telecommunications and computer companies has become  technologically almost
irrelevant.
Aldrich (1979) has argued that different organizations can coexist only if they are
dependent on different environmental resources. That means that although they are
influenced by the same technological regime, companies operating in computers and
telecommunications constitute different niches. It is remarkable to see that despite the
noted general convergence at the start of the 1980's, both computer and
telecommunications firms have retained most of their interest in their old’ technological
base, indicating no pattern of increased technological convergence within firms. The
ongoing process of technological convergence at the product-market and the technology
level has not been accompanied by a significant rise in the relative number of patents or
alliances in adjacent technologies. From an evolutionary perspective such patterns of
resistance to change are not unexpected. We think, however, that in the future companies
20
will have to adjust their aspiration levels of technological performance given the
potential of technological convergence in the IT industry. Therefore, we think that at that
time companies will be forced to redefine their core’ business and adapt their existing
technology base according to the demands of the new technological regime. Strategic
technology alliances in combination with internal development can be an important
means to achieve that goal. Although at present strategic technology alliances do not
seem to be extensively used to deal with the convergence process, we think that, given
the rapid increase in the number of newly established strategic technology alliances, they
can still play a very important role in changing high-tech sectors such as the IT industry.
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Figure 1 The sectoral distribution of patents of leading computer companies (three year moving
averages, 198061993).
Figure 2 The sectoral distribution of strategic technology alliances of leading computer
companies (three-year moving averages, 198061993).
Computers Telecom Micro-elec
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Computers Telecom Micro-elec
22
Figure 3 The sectoral distribution of patents of leading telecommunications equipment
companies (three-year moving averages, 198061993).
Figure 4 The sectoral distribution of strategic technology alliances of leading telecommunications
equipment companies (three year moving averages, 198061993).
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Table 1 Results of the regression analysis on alliances and patents of major computer companies.
B SE B T sig T R SE F Const2
Computers
Patents 1.036 0.244 4.243 0.011 0.599 3.686 17.99 29.040*
Alliances -0.171 0.698 -0.245 0.811 0.005 10.538 0.060 33.729
Telecom
Patents -0.191 0.288 -0.664 0.519 0.035 4.346 0.441 42.750
Alliances -0.171 0.699 -0.245 0.811 0.005 10.536 0.060 33.729
Micro-elec.
Patents -0.845 0.193 -4.380 0.001 0.615 2.911 19.18 28.206*
Alliances 0.330 0.790 0.417 0.684 0.014 11.919 0.174 36.380
  p < 0.01.*
Table 2 Results of the regression analysis on alliances and patents of major telecommunications
equipment companies.
B SE B T sig T R SE F Const2
Computers
Patents 0.291 0.180 1.618 0.132 0.179 2.717 2.617 15.015
Alliances 0.266 0.534 0.498 0.628 0.020 8.048 0.248 11.616
Telecom
Patents 0.431 0.198 2.171 0.050 0.282 2.992 4.712 54.765*
Alliances 0.752 0.724 1.039 0.319 0.083 10.918 1.080 40.633
Micro-elec.
Patents -0.722 0.154 -4.681 0.001 0.646 2.326 21.91 30.220**
Alliances -0.901 0.701 -1.286 0.223 0.121 10.570 1.654 46.457
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1. The introduction of stored program control (SPC) in electronic switches made it
possible to replace mechanical control systems by much more flexible software-based
control programs. 
2.In this  paper the term core competencies’ is used to describe the traditional focus
of the companies in our analysis.
3. Harper (1986) observed that in the early 1980s only a very limited number of
products embodied both communications and computing functions.
4. As semiconductor companies are vertically and not horizontally related to the other
IT industries we cannot test both hypotheses on these companies, as these hypotheses
relate primarily to ’lateral entry’.. Semiconductor companies are affected by the
convergence process basically by a change in the degree of diffusion of their
components in the end products of the computer and telecommunications industry.  
5. The full list of companies which are analysed in this paper can be found in
Appendix I.
6. We assume that alliances between government or academic institutions and private
companies are often less profit seeking and are to a lesser extent used for product
development.
7. For a further analysis of structural and strategic differences among companies from
various home countries, see Duysters and Hagedoorn (1996).
NOTES
